'노부오 시모토마이'에 해당되는 글 1건

  1. 2016.08.10 Nobuo Shimotomai, "Kim Il Sung's Balancing Act between Moscow and Beijing, 1956-1972."
독서/DPRK2016. 8. 10. 01:02

Nobuo Shimotomai, "Kim Il Sung's Balancing Act between Moscow and Beijing, 1956-1972," Tsuyoshi Hasegawa ed., The Cold War in East Asia, Washington, D.C., and Stanford, Calif.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Stanford University Press, 2011, p. 122-151.


Contents


Kim Il Sung and the New Soviet Leadership before the August-September Crisis

Foreign Influence in the KWP

In the Shadow of 1956

The Sino-Soviet Split

Treaties of Alliance with Moscow and with Beijing

North Korea's Policy toward the Developing World, and Moscow's Role

Lips and Teeth: Again with Mao

Pyongyang's Uneasy Partnership with Moscow, October 1964 to 1968

The Pueblo Incident

Kim Il Sung, Sino-Soviet Military Conflict, and U.S.-Chinese Rapprochement

Kim's Proposal for Confederation

Conclusion


"This chapter examines how Kim Il Sung maneuvered between Moscow and Beijing, exploiting the emerging Sino-Soviet conflict, in order to consolidate his power and pursue his own foreign policy." p. 123.

"Even the Stalinist Viacheslav Molotov had advised Nam Il, the DPRK's foreign minister, in April 1954 that the Koreans should pay more attention to the material needs of the population." p. 123. (AVPRF, f. 102, op. 10, p. 52, d. 8, ll. 66-67.)

"And the more Moscow and Beijing clashed, the more each wanted to draw Kim's government into its camp." p. 129.

"On April 28, Yi Sin Pkhar Submitted an earnest request to Gromyko that the USSR aid the DPRK in the peaceful utilization of nuclear technology." p. 130. (AVPRF, f. 102, op. 14, p. 75, d. 4, ll. 3-5.)

"In March 1959, the DPRK government had originally planned a Second Five-Year Plan from 1961 to 1965, but following Khrushchev's sudden adoption of a Seven-Year Plan, Kim followed the Soviet example in May 1960 and set the new time frame as 1961-67." p.132. (Shimotomai, Mosukuwa to Kin Nissei, 183; AVPRF, f. 102, op. 15, p. 83, d. 32, l. 2.)

The Treaty of Alliance with Moscow was concluded on July 6, 1961, and with China [The Sino-DPRK Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance] on July 11. p. 134-135.

"The treaty with the Soviet Union was effective for only ten years, whereas the treaty with China was effective for an indefinite period." p. 136. (Shimotomai, Mosukuwa to Kin Nissei, 293.)

"The tense relationship between Beijing and Moscow came to a head in the fall of 1961." p. 136.

"Puzanov's departure from Pyongyang in June 1962 marked the end of the generally benign relationship between the USSR and DPRK that lasted from 1957 to 1962." p. 137.

"The underlying reason for Kim's sharp turn toward Beijing was revealed in October 1962, when the PRC and the DPRK renegotiated their border issues, which resulted in the PRC-DPRK Border Treaty signed by Zhou Enlai and Kim Il Sung on October 12." p. 138.

V. P. Moskovskii. p. 138. (AVPRF, f. 102, op. 18, p. 93, d. 5)

"In the years 1963-64, the DPRK press was busy criticizing "revisionism" and denouncing those who wanted to negotiate with the United States." p. 139.

"Khrushchev's sudden departure form the political scene in October 1964 marked the end of the adversarial relationship between Moscow and Pyongyang." p. 139.

"Pyongyang stopped its anti-Soviet campaign soon after Khrushchev's ouster." p. 140.

"The Chinese "Great Cultural Revolution," which began in 1966, added another dimension to Asia's Cold War political landscape." p. 140.

"Further developments came in December 1966, when Brezhnev met with Kim Il Sung, first in Vladivostok and then in Moscow, in a series of high-level talks." p. 141-142.

"The Russian Foreign Ministry's archival documents contain very few substantial materials on bilateral relations during the period when N. G. Sudalikov served as the ambassador to Pyongyang from 1967 until 1974." p. 144.

"When the Sino-Soviet conflict was elevated to military confrontation, both Moscow and Beijing became more eager to recruit Pyongyang to their side." p. 144.

"He successfully maneuvered between Moscow and Beijing and maintained his independence, taking advantage of the Sino-Soviet conflict without completely committing himself to either side." p. 147.

"Kim's foreign gestures and moves were sometimes symbolic, were not substantial, and were lacking in any real commitment."  p. 147.

"Still, as long as the United States and Japan were regarded as hostile forces, and while the Big Brothers were turning out to be unreliable partners, Kim had to pursue "peaceful coexistence" with the ROK for cosmetic, and perhaps domestic, consumption."  p. 147.

Posted by 사용자 Л

댓글을 달아 주세요