독서/Cold War2019. 3. 4. 19:26

Repatriation ship prepares to depart Niigata Port. (Source: https://apjjf.org/2011/9/22/Tessa-Morris-Suzuki/3541/article.html)


In mid-December 1959, a group of Korean residents in Japan gathered in the port city Niigata from every corner of the Japanese Archipelago, with the uncertain hope of returning to the Socialist Fatherland and cherishing the better life, both of which were not easily imagined. Although 976 in number, the group was nor homogenous, neither easy to understand; in addition to Korean adults who could not speak Korean very well, there were Japanese, especially mothers and wives, students, and infants inside the crowd (12). Before getting aboard a ship, they were bureaucratically asked “[d]o you really wish to leave Japan and live the rest of your life in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea?”

Meanwhile, their imminent journey, or ‘exodus,’ to North Korea had to be processed in the humanitarian framework, mostly engineered by complicated interactions of different actors: not only Japanese entities such as the Japanese government, the Japanese Red Cross Society (est. 1877), and the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (Chongryun), but also Cold War superpowers like the U.S. and the Soviet Union altogether participated in and conspired with this massive project (199-200). A number of questions could be raised against the background of this untold exodus of Korean residents in Japan: Who were those who chose an exodus from Japan to North Korea? What were the origins of the Korean residents in Japan? Why did they want to return to their political homeland? Why did this kind of exodus have to happen in the late 1950s? Why were such powerful actors as the U.S. and the Soviet Union involved in the event? How did returnees continue living on North Korean soil? After all, what was it about (12-3)?

Exodus to North Korea: Shadows from Japan's Cold War (2007) is a pioneering work which exclusively deals with the aforementioned repatriation of Koreans in the late 1950s, based on multinational materials well as oral testimonies. As a renowned scholar of Japan and Asia, Tessa Morris-Suzuki, armed with expertise on the region, polyglotism in utilizing archival sources, and passion to visit relevant places including the North Korean capital, attempts to question the fates of “not only the lives of the 93,340 returnees,” but also those of “the hundreds of thousands of relatives and friends whom they left behind,” weaving representative cases of those accounts into a compelling as well as intriguing book. It is largely known that the author is one of the most critical and prolific scholars in the field, attempting to criticize as well as transcend what is known as ‘modern’ and an ‘modern’ view of the past. In this regard, the same author’s 2000 Henkyo kara nagameru [A View from the Frontier] lucidly reveals her academic interests on reconstructing the lively and vibrant exchanges among borderlines and peripheries where non-mainstream and tribal people such as Ainu, Nivkh, Uilta, and Manchu interacted and intermingled across the Sea of Okhotsk.

In terms of structure, Exodus to North Korea comprises twenty chapters unevenly allotted in five parts; each part covers the corresponding and related contents under umbrella terms such as Departures (Part I), Borderlines (II), Stratagems (III), Accord (IV), Arrivals (V). Characterizing the repatriation of Koreans from Japan to North Korea as exodus, the author walks the reader into invisible nodal points, where “the small stories of personal lives and the grand stories of global politics intersect.” In other words, Morris-Suzuki reconstructs one of the most complicated and multifaceted events during the Cold War period, which cut through the legacies of colonialism, desires of decolonization, and overwhelming forces of the Cold War polarity. Meanwhile, the subtitle of the book may give an impression to the reader that the story narrated in the book would be mostly about Japan and its postwar history. However, it would be fruitful to take well into consideration the authorial intention of blurring the strict demarcations between nations, states, and borders, all of which have been articulated and constructed as ‘modern’ projects. Then we can take a step forward towards the rigorous understanding of the past, the ‘exodus’ of Koreans from Japan in the periods 1959-1984 in this case, the shadow of which still affects the lives of a number of people.

The main thread that largely constitutes Exodus to North Korea is a series of repatriations of Koreans from Japan to the DPRK from 1959 to 1984, in accordance with the Calcutta Accord, signed on 13 August 1959 between the Japan Red Cross Society and the same society of North Korea (196). Be that as it may, the origin of this story goes back even to the colonial period. In other words, Exodus to North Korea needs to be understood in relation to colonialism. As the first few chapters show, during and after the Japanese colonial period of Korea, a significant number of Koreans, especially those from the southern part of the Peninsula and Jeju Island moved to “expanding Japanese cities,” seeking for a better life (48). Around liberation, some of them chose to go to Busan instead of Japanese cities in a bid to evade “the fighting on the Korean mainland” (55). In addition to the forcibly relocated subjects before 1945, these Koreans began to be regarded as ‘aliens’ by not only the Japanese authorities including the GHQ-SCAP (60-1), but also the South Korean government (66). Rika Hiroshi’s question to Yi Yang-Soo (himself) captures the desperate situation in which Korean residents in Japan had to face (63): “If I’m not Japanese, then what on earth am I?” To make matter worse, these ‘alien’ residents in Japan lost “the right to public housing and a range of other welfare benefits” as of 28 April 1952 (67). Up until the 1980s, this visible, social discrimination had lingered to the fullest, promoting the idea of returning to the Socialist Fatherland among the Zainichi Korean.

The Cold War divide would of no less importance in understanding this exodus to North Korea in contexts; rather, this issue not only set the tone of numerous affairs and exchanged including negotiations over the repatriation, but also offered different actors a varying degree of discretion. While it would be the latter point on which the author must have focused in narrating the story of the repatriation (13), Exodus to North Korea does seem to be aware of the limits and restrictions that the Cold War order imposed on people (14). In this vein, Morris-Suzuki spilt a considerable amount of ink through chapters seven to seventeen (Parts III and IV) in order to trace what had been going on at the highest and mid-high levels. While Part III presents individual histories as well as convoluted exchanges of significant figures such as Inoue Masutarō, Eugène de Weck, and Han Deok-Su, who played important roles in negotiating about the repatriation, Part IV registers the highest-level developments among the U.S., the Soviet Union, India, Japan, and both Koreas in the fateful years of 1958 and 1959. From my perspective, interested parties’ motives are succinctly summarized in chapter sixteen: Japan regarded the Zainichi Korean as “burden”; the ICRC outsourced the dealings of the issue to its branches in both Japan and North Korea; the North Korean state relied upon Chongryun in receiving labor force as well as legitimacy over South Korea, under the auspices of the Soviet Union; the Soviet Union supported North Korea in opposition to China; last but not least, the U.S. remained silent about the repatriation as long as it did not undermine its security interest on Japan (199-200). As Morris-Suzuki poignantly points out, “that silence [of the U.S.] was perhaps the final decisive factor that enabled the plans of all the others to become reality.”

The authorial focus has something to do with historical materials this book draws heavily upon: accounts and narratives from the Geneva-based International Committee of the Red Cross archives, diplomats’ diaries [logs] of JoongAng Russian archives, and partially declassified information of Foreign Relations of the United States only reveal “the tip of the iceberg” of historical truth produced by those who had the power to leave official records and personal observations. Nonetheless, the author tries to complement this lopsidedness of historical representation with a substantial amount of oral interviews. Recognizing the impossibility of fully reconstructing the past (249), Morris-Suzuki actively utilizes verbal accounts of those returnees in the first and last chapters of the book. For illustration, the reader would easily be able to imagine the degree of desperation as well as frustration of returnees when Oh Su-Ryong first saw “the scene” in Cheongjin on the morning of 25 February 1962 (231): “oh no!” Considering that the memory not only has a kernel of truth, but also could be serving as the only channel to the past like any historical research of the Japanese military “comfort women” issue, reproducing as well as interpreting those volatile accounts in a book is one of many academic virtues that Exodus to North Korea presents to the reader.

Last but not least, this book could have been substantially elaborated if the author had referred to existing scholarship of North Korean history in either Korean or English. This kind of criticism would not be doing justice given that the marginalized position of the North Korean history studies in both English- and Japanese-languages academia. However, Morris-Suzuki must have been careful in explaining specificities of not only North Korea, but also Korea in general. For example, I wonder what the author would mean by when she renders North Korea “Stalinist” (15). Another representative error the author makes could be located in chapter two where she mentions that “an even greater number had migrated to China, Manchuria, and the Soviet Union” (22). The number of Koreans who had migrated to the Soviet Union before “the Return of the Light” in 1945 could at best be less than 180,000 (around 170,000 Koreans were deported to Central Asia in 1937), being less than a tenth to “more than two million Koreans” the author cites. Unfounded assumption that “[m]any were arrested and disappeared in the DPRK’s expanding labor camps” could be problematic (175). There is no known place as “Yeodok” in North Korea (239); it must be Yodŏk. Notwithstanding the aforementioned issues, Exodus to North Korea will remain as a milestone regarding the 1959 repatriation of Koreans from Japan to North Korea in times to come, specifically for those interested in Japan-North Korea relations, the intersection of “small stories” and “grand stories” during the Cold War, and how to write a fascinating transnational history from diverse as well as decentered perspectives.

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독서/Cold War2018. 4. 1. 17:44

 What knowledge did the U.S. state/empire utilize in attempting to win hearts and minds of the people in the third world, thereby containing the expanding communist threat? Who were the experts producing such knowledge, and why did they do so in what contexts? Joy Rhode’s Armed with Expertise (2013) is a timely, welcome addition to the body of scholarship that deals with not only the aforementioned questions but also the development and transformation of the American social science in the Cold War period.

Centering on the rise, fall and rebirth of the Special Operations Research Office (SORO) since 1956, Rhode’s book illuminates the fraught relationship between social science and the national security state, democracy and militarization in the Cold War U.S. by tracing the development of “the gray area” and its dismantlement along with SORO’s absorption by the private American Institutes for Research in the early 1970s. Drawing upon primary sources from a presidential library, university archives and national archives, Rhode succeeds in reconstructing the militarization, privatization and undemocratization of the U.S. social science and presenting its historical legacy that lasted up to the present.

 The book consists of seven chapters including introduction and epilogue, opening and closing the story with American social scientists’ direct involvement in the War on Terror. How and why did these contract researchers come to the battlefield? Answering this question, the author offers the genealogy of U.S. social science’s militarization by historicizing the gray area, the “hazy” place between academia and the national security state,[1] where “not-elite intellectuals” tried to solve the entangled problem of democracy, expertise, and state security.

Chapters 1 and 2 respectively examine how the gray area was formed in the mid-1950s and how social scientists conducted research in that area in order to protect and promote democracy home and abroad. As seen in chapter 2, those researchers, Sorons, coming from “a surprising spectrum of epistemological and ethical positions” sought for their niche in the growing military-industrial-academic complex, becoming “engineers” to provide social theories to the American management efforts toward the third world. Project Camelot epitomized this imperial effort and the translation of the project’s unexpected termination into “more clandestine and more militarized” research as well as policymaking constitute chapter 3. Two ensuing chapters chronicle the increasing turf between the State and Defense departments, “two masters,” where it was the Defense department which heavily contracted Soron’s ilk and how “the gray area faded to black” as the Vietnam War ended and public attention to the threat of militarization disappeared.

 The militarizing fate of SORO and Sorons, as Rhode convincingly puts, embodied the inescapable influence of the Cold War. Born out of an American faith that “research could benefit academic social science, the military, and the free world,” they began to support U.S. projects since the mid-1950s. Sorons were by no means monolithic, but they shared certain assumptions that they should produce knowledge in order to protect democracy and that the antithesis to what they saw democracy was communism. These assumptions were ready to be practiced in the name of patriotism. In “third culture,” where was “not quite academic, not quite governmental,” such concerns as the militarization of social science, U.S. interventions on sovereign states and domestic social and political activism against the government were easily overshadowed by demands from the security state. Although its name was changed in 1966 and its institutional relation was severed from the host American University in 1969, knowledge produced by SORO became more militarized and privatized. In contrast to the previous era, since the early 1970s, contract scholars who had inhabited the gray area generating expertise on foreign lands “truly became servants of power” and “unquestioningly affirmed the Cold War status quo.”

 In Rhode’s intriguing account on the gray area, certain points seem to stand out for further discussions. As for “Cold War social scientists” in chapter 2, it would have been more plural if the author had added more researchers who confronted the same issue—“the expert’s proper role in democracy.” This suggestion might expand to the collective biography of “Cold War social scientists” whose narratives and practices virtually shaped the U.S. understanding of the second and third worlds. In this regard, comparison of the SORO works with the contemporaneous self-understanding produced by third world countries themselves would be no less interesting. Speaking of U.S. defense spending and contracting, which Rhode critically engages in, it would have been more helpful if she had suggested some insights that could inform the reader how to approach the situation democratically. Last but not least, it does not seem to be clear to appreciate the book’s main argument.[2] Notwithstanding these issues, Armed with Experts would undoubtedly serve the reader interested in the Cold War, U.S. social science and previously overlooked agencies who really influenced the U.S. understanding of the Other.



[1] In her doctoral dissertation, Rhode used the term “the boundary zone” instead of “the gray area.” Joy Elizabeth Rhode, "'The social scientists' war': Expertise in a Cold War nation" (PhD dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 2007). Dissertations available from ProQuest. AAI3271806.

[2] Her recent article seems to be written in the same line with Armed with Expertise. Joy Rhode, “From Expert Democracy to Beltway Banditry: How the Antiwar Movement Expanded the Military-Academic-Industrial Complex,” in Cold War Social Science: Knowledge Production, Liberal Democracy, and Human Nature, ed. Mark Solovey and Hamilton Cravens (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 137-153.


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독서/Cold War2017. 11. 28. 14:02

Book info

Imposing, Maintaining, and Tearing Open the Iron Curtain 

The Cold War and East-Central Europe, 1945–1989 

EDITED BY MARK KRAMER AND VIT SMETANA


Table of Contents


Introduction  By Mark Kramer and Vít Smetana


Part 1. Central Europe and the Onset of the Iron Curtain


Chapter 1. Stalin, Soviet Policy, and the Establishment of a Communist Bloc in Eastern Europe, 1941–1949  By Mark Kramer
Chapter 2. The United States and Eastern Europe, 1943–1948  By Michael F. Hopkins
Chapter 3. Concessions or Conviction? Czechoslovakia's Road to the Cold War and the Soviet Bloc  By Vít Smetana
Chapter 4. Hungary's Role in the Soviet Bloc, 1945–1956  By László Borhi
Chapter 5. Stalin, the Split with Yugoslavia, and Soviet-East European Efforts to Reassert Control, 1948–1953  By Mark Kramer
Chapter 6. Austria, Germany, and the Cold War, 1945–1955  By Rolf Steininger
Chapter 7. Neutrality for Germany or Stabilizing the Eastern Bloc? New Evidence on the Decision-Making Process of the Stalin Note  By Peter Ruggenthaler


Part 2. The German Question and Intra-Bloc Politics in the Post-Stalin Era


Chapter 8. The Berlin Wall: Looking Back on the History of the Wall Twenty Years after Its Fall  By Hope M. Harrison
Chapter 9. The German Problem and Security in Europe: Hindrance or Catalyst on the Path to 1989–1990?  By Oliver Bange
Chapter 10. Germany and East-Central Europe, 1945–1990: The View from London  By Anne Deighton
Chapter 11. The German Question as Seen from Paris  By Georges-Henri Soutou
Chapter 12. Cold War, Détente and the Soviet Bloc: The Evolution of Intra-bloc Foreign Policy Coordination, 1953–1975  By Csaba Békés


Part 3. The Role of East-Central Europe in Ending the Cold War


Chapter 13. Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and the Revolutions of 1989: U.S. Myths versus the Primary Sources  By Thomas Blanton
Chapter 14. Moscow and Eastern Europe 1988–1989: A Policy of Optimism and Caution  By Alex Pravda
Chapter 15. The Opening of the Wall, Eastern Europe, and Gorbachev's Vision of Europe after the Cold War  By Svetlana Savranskaya
Chapter 16. Pulling the Rug: East-Central Europe and the Implosion of East Germany  By Bernd Schaefer
Chapter 17. The Demise of the Soviet Bloc  By Mark Kramer


Part 4. Long-Term Perspectives on the Cold War and Its End


Chapter 18. Nuclear Weapons and the Cold War in Europe  By David Holloway
Chapter 19. Why Did the Cold War Last So Long?  By Mark Kramer
Chapter 20. The End of the Cold War as a Non-Linear Confluence  By Richard Ned Lebow
Chapter 21. Conspicuous Connections: 1968 and 1989  By Oldrich Tuma
Chapter 22. 1989 in Historical Perspectives: The Problem of Legitimation  By Silvio Pons
Chapter 23. The End of the Cold War and the Transformation of Cold War History: A Tale of Two Conferences, 1988–1989  By James G. Hershberg


차례


서론


1부. 중앙유럽과 철의 장막의 개시


1장. 스탈린, 소련의 정책, 동유럽에서 공산주의진영 세우기, 1941-1949

2장. 미국과 동유럽, 1943-1948

3장. 양보 또는 신념? 체코슬로바키아의 냉전 및 소비에트진영으로의 여정

4장. 소비에트진영 안에서 헝가리의 역할, 1945-1956

5장. 스탈린, 유고슬라비아와의 분열, 주도권을 다시 잡기 위한 소비에트-동유럽의 노력, 1948-1953

6장. 오스트리아, 독일, 냉전, 1945-1955

7장. 독일 중립화 또는 동유럽 안정화? 스탈린 언급(Stalin Note)의 정책결정 과정에 대한 새로운 증거


2부. 스탈린 사후 시기의 독일 문제와 진영내 정치


8장. 베를린 장벽: 장벽 붕괴 20년 후에 돌아보는 장벽의 역사

9장. 독일 문제와 유럽의 안보: 1989-1990년으로 향하는 도정으로의 방해였나, 촉매였나

10장. 독일과 중동부 유럽, 1945-1990: 런던의 시각

11장. 파리의 시각에서 본 독일 문제

12장. 냉전, 긴장완화와 소비에트진영: 진영내 외교정책 조율의 전개, 1953-1975


3부. 냉전을 종식시킨 중동부 유럽의 역할


13장. 로널드 레이건, 조지 H.W. 부시, 1989년의 혁명들: 미국 신화 대(對) 1차 자료

14장. 모스크바와 동유럽 1988-1989: 낙관주의와 신중의 정책

15장. 장막의 개막, 동유럽, 냉전 이후 고르바초프의 유럽 전망

16장. 뒤통수 치기: 중동부 유럽과 동독의 내파

17장. 소비에트진영의 붕괴


4부. 장기적 관점에서 본 냉전과 냉전의 종식


18장. 유럽에서의 핵무기와 냉전

19장. 왜 그리 냉전은 오래 지속되었나?

20장. 비선형적 결론으로서의 냉전 종식

21장. 눈에 띠는 연계들: 1968년과 1989년

22장. 역사적 관점에서 본 1989년: 정당화의 문제

23장. 냉전의 종식과 냉전사의 전환: 두 회담 이야기, 1988-1989

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